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ENTERTAINMENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW:
SECTION 303 OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT IS
AMENDED AND A PRE-78 PHONORECORD
DISTRIBUTION OF A MUSICAL WORK IS NOT A
DIVESTITIVE PUBLICATION
Jonathan C. Stewart* and Daniel E. Wanat"
PROLOGUE
On November 13, 1997, section 303 of the Copyright Act of the
United States was amended to provide: "(b) The distribution before Janu-
ary 1, 1978, of a phonorecord shall not for any purpose constitute a publi-
cation of the musical work embodied therein."' This amendment was en-
acted to settle a controversy between the copyright owners of musical
compositions and the numerous groups who use those compositions, most
prominently, sound recording companies. This controversy had its origin in
the system of legal protection afforded to the copyright owners of music
within the United States until January 1, 1978, the effective date of the pres-
ent Copyright Act.2 This Article begins in Part I with a description of a mu-
* Jonathan Stewart is an associate attorney at the Nashville, Tennessee law firm of Bass,
Berry & Sims PLC and practices in the intellectual property and commercial litigation areas. He
has a law degree from the University of Memphis, a Master of Theological Studies from Vanderbilt
University, and a Bachelor of Arts from Rhodes College.
** Professor of Law, University of Memphis, School of Law. Professor Wanat teaches Copy-
right and Entertainment Law and has published a number of articles in these areas. He received
his Juris Doctorate from DePaul University, School of Law and holds a masters degree in law from
The University of Illinois, College of Law. I would like to thank the University of Memphis School
of Law Foundation for providing a stipend that supported, in part, my work on this Article.
1. Title 17 Technical Amendments, Pub. L. No. 105-80, 111 Stat. 1534 (1997).
2. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1976). With the advent of the present Copyright Act, a musical
work authored on or after the Act's effective date is protected from the moment it is "fixed in any
tangible medium of expression" and not when offered to the public for sale in the form of phonore-
cords. Id. § 102(a). A work is "fixed" "when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or
under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration . I..." Id  §
101.
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sic composer's craft and the commercial exploitation of the resulting songs.
Part II offers a brief orientation to the copyright law concepts, statutes, and
precedents necessary to understand the question of divestitive publication in
relation to musical works and their distribution by phonorecord retail sale.
Part III traces the various court decisions on the subject, focusing primarily
on two reported court of appeals decisions known as Rosette and La
Cienega. Part IV reviews the history of the amendment to section 303 of the
present Copyright Act which is Congress's answer to the divestitive publi-
cation controversy. Finally, Part V offers some commentary on this prob-
lem, which in particular addresses the La Cienega decision in light of the
recently enacted section 303(b), which is an apparent codification of the Ro-
sette rule.
I. INTRODUCTION
Some composers create songs by writing down musical notes and
words on pieces of paper, by making a demonstration tape, or by producing
a transcription of the music and words. Other composers create songs or
author musical works by improvisational, perhaps collaborative, live playing
of musical instruments, putting nothing on paper.3
More importantly, most composers exploit or authorize the exploita-
tion of the fruits of their creativity (e.g., their songs), by selling those
authorship rights which are granted to them under copyright laws. Sound
recording companies, on the other hand, reap rewards by recording perform-
ances of the song and then selling copies of that performance or by author-
izing someone else to sell a performance of the song in the form of phonore-
cords (e.g., compact discs, cassette tapes, vinyl albums).4 The song's
composer, thereafter, may receive royalties that come from sales of the
sound recordings of his or her song.5
3. The distinction between music which in some form is made tangible and that which is not
made tangible in some form is one which Congress has chosen to mark the subsistence of a federal
copyright ordinarily. Id. § 102(a) (stating that a copyright may be secured in original works of
authorship only when reduced to tangible form.). As to music which is improvised as played and
so not made tangible in some form, a composer's or the composers' authorship rights are governed
ordinarily by state law. Id. § 301(a) (stating that state rights that are the equivalent of a copyright
under Title 17 of the United States Code are preempted in those works only which are reduced to
some tangible form).
4. The controversy which is the subject of this Article arose prior to the advent of CD's or
audio cassettes. In fact, the controversy has its origins in the pianola role. See infra notes 75-83
and accompanying text.
5. In a typical case, the composer conveys, either directly or indirectly through a music pub-
lisher, to a sound recording company those rights which are needed for that company to make the
sound recording. The rights beforehand have been granted by Congress under the federal Copy-
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The recording of musical compositions has, of course, only been pos-
sible within approximately the last one hundred years. 6 In the nineteenth
century, and even before, the only way that composers could make money
from their musical compositions, other than charging for the right to hear a
live public performance, was to put the composition on paper, make or print
copies, and then cause the distribution and sale of printed copies in the form
of sheet music.
7
Federal copyright law has granted protection to musical compositions
since 1831,8 when Congress comprehensively revised the Copyright Act of
1790, 9 the first copyright statute in the United States. Ever since then, com-
posers have enjoyed the protection of federal law for their "written" music.
If these composers complied with the requirements of the federal statute,
they had the exclusive rights, within limits, to make, distribute, and sell
copies of sheet music for the duration of their statutory copyright. 10
right Act to the composer as the author-owner. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(5) (1976). A com-
poser's conveyance to a sound recording company would include the right to reproduce the song in
the form of phonorecords (e.g., CDs' or cassette tapes), the right to distribute the song by means of
sale or otherwise, and the right to prepare a derivative work from the song (e.g., the sound record-
ing). Id. § 106(1)-(3).
6. See infra note 11.
7. See infra note 11 and accompanying text.
8. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch.16, § 5, 4 Stat. 436 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 5(e) (1952)),
repealed by Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
9. Act of May 31, 1790, Ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. This original statute only protected books,
maps, and charts. See id.
10. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch.16, § 5, 4 Stat. 436 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 5(e) (1952)),
repealed by Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976). Limitations upon
the exclusive rights of the owner of a federal copyright have given a significant role to the relation-
ship between the owners and users of copyrightable materials. Moreover, for much of this century
the subsistence of a federal copyright was conditioned upon compliance with various formalities
set out in copyright law.
Issues concerning the loss of a federal copyright for non-compliance with statutory formalities,
however, have all but vanished under the present Copyright Act so far as concerns music created
on or after that Act's effective date of January 1, 1978. Indeed, from its effective date to the pres-
ent, the Act has periodically been amended to either eliminate or ameliorate any ill-effects of non-
compliance or to eliminate formalities altogether. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 402(a)-(b) (1997),
amended by Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853
(1988).
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With the advent of the phonograph" in the late nineteenth century,
composers were presented with a new way to profit from their music: they
or someone acting under their authority could record a performance of the
composition and sell reproductions of it to the exclusion of all others. A
phonorecord of the sound recording was the tangible form that the reproduc-
tions were intended to be under the statute.12 During the middle half of the
twentieth century, the music recording industry emerged and grew to enor-
mous proportions by exploiting this new technology.' 3 Composers would
create songs, performances of those songs would be recorded, and the re-
cordings would be sold to the public in the form of phonorecords. In fact,
often the first offering of a song to the public was through a phonorecord,
with sheet music being printed and distributed only if the song was suffi-
ciently popular. 14
This practice presented, and continues to present, an interesting ques-
tion of copyright law: does such a distribution of phonorecords, when oc-
curring before the effective date of the present Copyright Act, constitute a
publication of the underlying musical composition sufficient to divest its
owner of a common law copyright when certain formalities required by fed-
eral copyright law have not been met? 5 The answer to this question is of
substantial economic importance to the authors of musical compositions,
those to whom they may have assigned their rights in the compositions (e.g.,
music publishing companies), the sound recording companies who cause the
11. Thomas Edison invented the phonograph in 1877, using a wax cylinder with spiral
grooves as the medium in which sound was recorded. Flat disks were first introduced in 1887 by
Emil Berliner. But it was not until electrical recording devices were developed in 1925 that the
phonograph could become a practically useful invention. THE COLUMBIA-VIKING DESK EN-
CYCLOPEDIA, 769 (William Bridgwater ed., 1953).
12. The Copyright Act defines the term phonorecords as:
material objects in which sounds, other than those accompanying a motion picture or
other audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known or later developed, and
from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term "phonorecords" in-
cludes the material object in which the sounds are first fixed.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). Sound recordings are defined under the statute as works that result from
the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompa-
nying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material objects,
such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied. Id.
13. S. Shemel & M. Krasilovsky, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC, (Paul Ackerman, rev. ed. 1995).
14. See Robert J. Burton, Business Practices in the Copyright Field, in SEVEN COPYRIGHT
PROBLEMS ANALYZED 87, 103 (Theodore R. Kupferman ed. 1952).
15. See generally Benjamin Kaplan, Publication in Copyright Law: The Question of Pho-
nograph Records, 103 U. PA. L. REV, 469 (1955).
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compositions to be recorded and distributed as phonorecords, and other us-
ers of music.
16
In this regard, if a pre-1978 distribution of phonorecords of musical
compositions was deemed to be a divestitive publication, then vast numbers
of those compositions may have been inadvertently injected into the public
domain. This divestitive result occurred because the federal Copyright Act
required notice of copyright 17 upon publication, and this was typically omit-
ted from phonorecords when distributed through retail sale. 8 Music com-
posers, publishers, copyright owners of music, and their attorneys appar-
ently considered a phonorecord distribution not to be a divestitive
publication. ' 9 In the early 1950's, however, contrary dicta appeared in some
federal district court opinions.2°
Federal district courts, thereafter, were split over the next twenty
years. Then, in 1976, the Second Circuit, in Rosette v. Rainbo Record
Mfg. 21 held that the widespread distribution of phonorecords was not a pub-
lication of the underlying musical composition. As a result of this decision,
composers, their publishers, as well as the copyright bar's initial intimation,
finally had some substantial authority to support their claims.
16. The other users, of particular note, are commercial broadcasters who are obligated to ob-
tain authorization from the copyright owner or her agent for public performances of the copy-
righted music. See generally Boucher, Blanket Licensing and Local Television: An Historical
Accident in Need of Reform, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1157 (1987).
17. The Copyright Act of 1909 provided for acquisition of federal copyright protection by
publication with notice. 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1952) (repealed effective 1978). Section 19 of the Act
covered the form of proper notice. 17 U.S.C. § 19 (1952) (repealed effective 1978). Publication
absent notice could result then in the failure to acquire a copyright under the 1909 Act. In addi-
tion, the publication could cause any state copyright protection to be extinguished. The net result
was that the musical composition entered the public domain where anyone would be free to use all
or part of that work. Id.
18. It must be kept in mind that the phonorecord distributed embodied two distinct works of
authorship. The first work subsists in the sounds derived from the performance of the musical
composition. The second work subsists in the musical composition on which the performance was
based. For the better part of the twentieth century, a federal copyright did not subsist in the
sounds embodied on the phonorecord. That such a copyright could exist was first recognized in
the 1909 Copyright Act as of February 1, 1972. 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1952) (amended effective Feb. 1,
1972) (repealed effective 1978).
19. See discussion infra Part III.A.
20. See WILLIAM F. PATRY, LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 145 (6th ed. 1986). The cases.
containing dicta that phonorecord distribution was divestitive publication include Shapiro, Bern-
stein & Co. v. Miracle Record Co., 91 F. Supp. 473 (N.D. I11. 1950); Mills Music v. Cromwell Mu-
sic, 126 F. Supp. 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
21. 546 F.2d 461 (2nd Cir. 1976).
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It would take almost another twenty years before another court of ap-
peals would issue a reported opinion on the subject. In 1995, to the dismay
of many within the music industry, the Ninth Circuit, in La Cienega Music
v. ZZ Top,12 reached a decision opposite the one in Rosette. A divided panel
held that, under the 1909 Copyright Act, a distribution of phonorecords
without any copyright notice constituted a divestitive publication of the un-
derlying musical composition and irrevocably injected the work into the
public domain.23
The La Cienega decision was, to say the very least, unpopular within
the segment of the music industry which was represented by the copyright
owners of music.24 Its rule was also contrary to the "long-standing view of
the Copyright Office" on this subject. 2' La Cienega has also been the sub-
ject of some scholarly criticism. 6 Two of the most respected treatises on
copyright law, however, clearly agreed with the logic of the La Cienega
court's holding.27
It took no more than two years. from the La Cienega decision for Con-
gress to act in response to the Ninth Circuit's holding. In 1997, it passed
section 303(b) of the Copyright Act which stated that "[t]he distribution be-
fore January 1, 1978, of a phonorecord shall not for any purpose constitute
a publication of the musical work embodied therein.,
28
II. DIVESTITIVE PUBLICATION UNDER THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT
Section 303 of the Copyright Act was amended on November 13, 1997
in order to define certain limits of the legal event of publication.29 These
22. 53 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 1995).
23. When confronted with the holding of the La Cienega court and that of the Rosette court,
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee chose to follow the rule in La
Cienega. As such, the musical compositions of plaintiff copyright owners, were held to have ir-
revocably fallen into the public domain when, without notice of copyright, phonorecords embody-
ing the compositions were distributed publicly. Mayhew v. Gusto Records, Inc., 960 F. Supp.
1302 (1997). The rule in Mayhew and La Cienega, as a well as the opposing rule of Rosette are
now subject to 17 U.S.C. § 303(b). See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
24. H.R. REP. No. 105-325, at 2-4 (1997).
25. Id.
26. See Mark A. Bailey, Phonorecords and Forfeiture of Common-law Copyright in Music,
71 WASH. L. REv. 151 (1996). But see Recent Case, Copyright - Phonorecords - Ninth Circuit
Holds that Phonorecord Sales Publish the Underlying Musical Composition - La Cienega Music
Co. v. ZZ Top, 108 HARv. L. REv. 2059 (1995).
27. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, 1 COPYRIGHT § 3.2.2.2, at 3:21 (2d ed. 1996); 1 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 4.05[B], at 4-26 (1996).
28. Title 17 Technical Amendments, PUB. L. 105-80, 111 STAT. 1531 (1997).
29. H.R. REP. No. 105-325, at 2.
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limits concerned the distribution of phonorecords made before the effective
date of the present Act, January 1, 1978.30 Prior to January 1, 1978, the
concept of publication was of central importance under the 1909 Copyright
Act.3" It marked the dividing line between common law copyright and fed-
eral statutory copyright.
According to Supreme Court precedent, publication was the point
when a created work lost any common law protection that it had.32 By vir-
tue of the 1909 Copyright Act, publication was the point at which a work
became protected by federal statutory copyright, provided that the requisite
notice requirements were followed.33 If a work was published without the
required notice, it was deemed to have been dedicated to the public domain,
30. The amendment sought to make clear that the distribution of a musical record, disc or
tape before 1978 did not consist a publication of the musical composition(s) embodied in that disc
or tape. Id.
31. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, repealed by Copyright Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541. This copyright law was in force throughout much of the twentieth
century. Its provisions regulated the rights and limits of a copyright in music for almost the entire
period before the advent of the present Copyright Act. It was under the 1909 Copyright Act, there-
fore, that much of the controversy concerning whether record sales constituted a publication of the
underlying musical composition arose.
32. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834). The court found it unpalatable for a creator to
have perpetual protection in the form of an exclusive common law right to control his work, while
at the same time being able to exploit the work through publication. Once published, the court
concluded that the limited monopoly provided by federal statute was the only protection available,
thus balancing the need for an incentive for the creator with the need of society to eventually have
free access to works. Id. at 657; see infra note 44 and accompanying text.
The Wheaton court considered two early landmark English cases which considered common
law copyright and the English copyright statute, The Statute of Anne, 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710).
Those cases were Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 4 Burr. 2303 (K.B. 1769) and Donaldson v.
Becket, 98 Eng. Rep. 257, 4 Burr. 2408 (1774).
The Wheaton court concluded that the "law appears to be well settled in England, that, since
the Statute of 8 Anne, the literary property of an author in his works can only be asserted under the
statute." Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 657. While that was indeed the law in England, it has been the
subject of some debate as to whether the decision in Donaldson was that there was never any
common law copyright, or rather that whatever common law right there might have been was com-
pletely preempted by statute. See Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American
Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REv. 1119
(1983).
Note that what is commonly referred to as "common law copyright" is the right of first publi-
cation, as opposed to an exclusive right to control use, adaptation, and copying subsequent to pub-
lication. See id at 1129-30. Wheaton and subsequent cases all acknowledged a common law
right of first publication. See infra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
33. See Copyright Act of 1909 § 10, 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1952) (repealed effective 1978).
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thereby allowing anyone the right to use, modify, and copy the work as they
wished.34
Common law copyright is often described as the right of first publica-
tion, meaning that the work's creator had absolute control over when, if
ever, the product of his creativity would be exposed to the public at large.35
The justification for this absolute control stemmed from the author's interest
in privacy and in the integrity of his personality of which his work was an
expression.36 For example, a person's personal correspondence, though
brilliantly composed and of immense interest to the public, could not be
published unless and until the author decided to do SO. 3 7 This is due to the
fact that the author may consider the substance of such letters to be so per-
sonal and private that he does not desire that the general public be given ac-
cess to them.38 Likewise, the author of a book may never want it exposed to
public view because he considers it poorly written. More realistically, this
author may simply object to the timing of publication, similar to when he
forbids a publication until his publisher agrees to pay a certain price. Inter-
estingly, common law gave to the creator all of this control.39  However,
34. See National Comics v. Fawcett, 191 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951); PATRY, supra note 20, at
138; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 27, § 3.1, at 3:4-3:5.
To the extent that federal courts were deciding that a work, such as a musical composition,
was dedicated to the public as a result of a publication without compliance with the 1909 Act's
notice requirements, they were engaging in a legal fiction. In many such cases, courts found it un-
necessary that an author possess some sort of a donative intent. Quite the contrary was more often
than not the case. See, e.g., White v. Kimmell, 193 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1952).
35. See Kaplan supra note 15, at 469; Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, 279 N.Y.S.
2d 51, 54-55 (Sup. Ct. 1967), affirmed, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1968).
36. Kaplan, supra note 15, at 470.
37. See Salinger v. Random House, 811 F.2d 90 (2nd Cir. 1987). The court there stated:
Prior to 1978, unpublished letters, like other unpublished works, were protected by
common law copyright, but the 1976 Copyright Act preempted the common law of
copyright... and brought unpublished works under the protection of federal copy-
right law, which includes the right of first publication among the rights accorded to
the copyright owner ....
Id. at 94 (citations omitted).
38. The general rule relating to personal letters and the author's privacy interest as sufficient
to prevent public access may at times be tempered, however, by the public's interest in knowing
what the author had to say. See Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, 279 N.Y.S. 2d 51 (Sup.
Ct. 1967), affirmed, 296 N.Y.S. 2d 771 (1968).
39. Any work actually created in tangible form (e.g., written down or recorded) can no longer
receive such perpetual protection by the common law, as the 1976 Copyright Act preempts the
common law not just for published works, but for any work fixed in a tangible medium of expres-
sion. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1976). At the end of the federal statutory protection, the work falls into
the public domain.
In addition, although a work may be protected while unpublished under the 1976 Copyright
Act, that status alone does not accord the work and its author any rights under the Act greater than
those granted the author of a protected published work. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
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once the work was published, the creator under common law lost creative
control. As a result, an author could not control the work's use or adapta-
tion. Indeed, an author could not even keep inexpensive copies from being
made and sold to compete with his own authorized editions.40
At this point, if an author's work was to be protected, the protection
would come from federal statutory copyright law. As authorized by the
Constitution, Congress passed laws giving limited protection to "authors"
for their "writings." 41 Under the 1909 Copyright Act, a creator could claim
statutory protection for his work in one of two ways: (1) publication of the
work with notice of copyright42 or (2) deposit of the work or part(s) thereof
with a claim of copyright.43
The Constitution made this grant to Congress and Congress has since
deemed copyright protection necessary to encourage persons to be creative
and produce intellectual works for the public's ultimate benefit. The think-
ing was and continues to be that authors (including composers) will be more
productive and creative in anticipation of the economic benefit which a
property interest facilitates."
In pure utilitarian terms, the object of copyright protection is to have
some optimal level of creative works available to the public at reasonable
prices. But, while increasing the level and duration of control that a creator
has over his work tends to increase the level of creativity and the quantity of
works produced in a society, it also tends to increase the price everyone else
must pay for those works. On the other hand, decreasing the level and dura-
v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
40. Publication divested the author of all rights at state law. See supra notes 32-34 and ac-
companying text.
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This clause provides that "Congress shall have the power.
[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id.
The clause was adopted by the Constitutional Convention without debate. PATRY, supra note
20, at 5. Congress passed the first copyright statute in 1790. It was amended several times during
the nineteenth century, often by the addition of a new form of copyrightable subject matter (e.g.,
musical compositions in 1831 and photographs in 1865). In 1909, copyright law was extensively
reworked, as it was again in 1976. The 1976 Act, as amended, is the current federal copyright
statute.
42. 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1952) (repealed effective 1978).
43. 17 U.S.C. § 12 (1952) (repealed effective 1978).
44. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). Stated in
the majority opinion of Justice Stewart, "ft]he immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a
fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate
artistic creativity for the general public good." Id.
1998]
32 LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19
tion of control that a creator has over his work brings the price of any cre-
ated works down. It also tends to decrease the quality and quantity of those
works because from any one individual's perspective, there is less incentive
to create because there is less money to be made. Federal copyright law, by
giving a property interest in intellectual works for a limited time, seeks to
achieve an appropriate balance between these two extremes.45 In order to
represent these two interests, copyright law must definitively reflect this bal-
ance. 46
When an author, such as a music composer, chooses to publish his
work, more often than not he is seeking to exploit that work for individual
economic gain. Federal copyright law, recognizing that such a work might
never have been created without the prospect of such economic gain, facili-
tates this motive by granting the creator exclusive rights in his work (e.g. to
perform publicly, to reproduce, etc.) 41 for a specified period of time after
which the work will fall into the public domain and be free for anyone to use
and/or reproduce. For example, the 1976 Copyright Act generally protects a
work for the life of the creator plus seventy years, whereas the 1909 Act
protected a work for twenty-eight years, with an available extension of an-
other twenty-eight years (fifty-six years total).48
Both the concept of a common law copyright and the event of publica-
tion under the 1909 Copyright Act are of considerable importance today, es-
pecially the concept of publication. Although under the 1976 Act a copy-
right in a work attaches upon fixation "in a tangible medium of
expression,"' 9 rather than upon publication with notice50 as provided within
45. Id.
46. H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 7 (1909).
In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider ... two questions: First, how
much will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit the public; and, sec-
ond, how much will the monopoly granted be detrimental to the public? The grant-
ing of such exclusive rights, under the proper terms and conditions, confers a benefit
upon the public that outweighs the evils of the temporary monopoly.
Id.
47. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994). The analogous provision of the 1909 Act was 17 U.S.C. § 1
(1952) (repealed effective 1978).
48. The Copyright Act of 1976 § 302, as recently amended, prescribes the following time
periods for protection: generally, the life of the author plus seventy years; for joint works, the life
of the longest living author plus seventy years; for anonymous, pseudonymous, and made-for-hire
works, ninety-five years from the date of first publication or one hundred years from creation,
whichever comes first. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1994), amended by Sonny Bono Copyright Term Exten-
sion Act, Pub L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998). Copyright Act of 1909 § 24 prescribed a
period of twenty-eight years from first publication, with a renewal of another twenty-eight years
allowed. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1952) (repealed effective 1978).
49. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
50. 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1952) (repealed effective 1978).
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the 1909 Act,51 any work in the public domain on the effective date of the
1976 Act, January 1, 1978, remains unprotected by copyright.
52
Because publication without notice of copyright before 1978 dedicated
a work to the public domain,53 frequently a determination as to whether or
not a particular action constituted such divestitive publication must be made.
This question must be decided under the 1909 Act, the law applicable to all
works created before 1978. In fact, musical works underlying a sound re-
cording prior to the Copyright Act's amendment in November of 199714
faced this exact problem.
Furthermore, the 1909 Act did not include a definition of publication.
This was apparently intentional, as it was thought that a general, abstract
definition was too difficult to articulate.55 The definition of "the date of
publication" was specified, however. Section 26 of the 1909 Act defined the
date of publication "in the case of a work of which copies are reproduced for
sale or distribution" as "the earliest date when copies of the first authorized
edition were placed on sale, sold, or publicly distributed by the proprietor of
the copyright or under his authority. 56 Courts consistently held that this
language did not define publication, but rather served only to fix the date
from which statutory protection began to run.5 7 Thus, courts were left to
develop the definition of publication.
In deciding whether or not a given act constituted "publication" under
the 1909 Act, courts often were influenced by the consequences of their de-
cision on the parties before them. Courts generally made decisions based
upon whether a finding of publication would invest statutory copyright un-
der § 10 of the 1909 Act, or whether such a finding would result only in a
divestiture of common law copyright, thereby forfeiting the creators rights
and injecting the work into the public domain. The courts required little to
find investitive publication, but much more to find a divestitive publication.
51. Id.
52. Transitional and Supplementary Provisions of 1976 Copyright Act § 103, 90 Stat. 2559
(1976).
53. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
54. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
55. Hearings on S. 6330 and H.l 19853 Before the Joint Comms. on Patents, 59th Cong.
71(1906).
56. 17 U.S.C. § 26 (1952) (repealed effective 1978).
57. See Cardinal Film Corp. v. Beck, 248 F. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1918); Hirshon v. United Artists
Corp., 243 F.2d 640 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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In the first decision to acknowledge such a double standard,58 the court ob-
served:
[Clourts apply different tests of publication depending on
whether plaintiff is claiming protection because he did not
publish and hence has a common law claim of infringement-
in which case the distribution must be quite large to constitute
publication-or whether he is claiming under the copyright
statute-in which case the requirements for publication are
quite narrow. In each case the courts appear so to treat the
concept of "publication" as to prevent piracy.5 9
As is the case in many contexts, courts abhorred a forfeiture and
tended to adjust the requirements for a finding of publication depending
upon whether such a finding would result in a forfeiture of the creator's
rights.
The other distinction made by courts which enabled them to ascribe a
meaning to divestitive publication arose from the division of publication into
two categories: limited and general. In principle, a limited publication was
one that was published to a limited number of persons and for a limited pur-
pose. Its occurrence, when found, would not result in the divestiture of
common law rights.60 A general publication, on the other hand, involved the
creator relinquishing subsequent control over his creation by a broad dis-
semination of his work. Such a general publication would result in divesti-
ture and, if the federal statutory requirements were not met, a dedication of
the work to the public domain.61
Accordingly, questions arose concerning circumscribed distributions.
Thus, when Martin Luther King, Jr. distributed copies of his "I Have a
Dream" speech, without copyright notice, to members of the press to help
them report on the speech, it was later argued that he had published the
speech and thereby lost common law protection of his work. The court con-
sidering the issue decided that such a distribution was a limited publication
because it was limited to a group consisting only of reporters, and was for
the limited purpose of assisting them in reporting on the speech.62 Less no-
58. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 27, at § 3.2.1.
59. American Visuals Corp. v. Holland, 239 F.2d 740, 744 (2nd Cir. 1956).
60. See White v. Kimmell, 193 F.2d 744, 746-47 (9th Cir. 1952); American Vitagraph v.
Levy, 659 F.2d 1023, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 1981); PATRY, supra note 20, at 140-41; MARSHALL
LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 112-13 (2d ed. 1995).
61. American Vitagraph, 659 F.2d at 1026-27; PATRY, supra note 20, at 140-41.
62. See King v. Mister Maestro, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). But see Es-
tate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 13 F.Supp.2d 1347 (N.D.Ga. 1998) (Dr. King's
oral delivery of the speech in concert with its simultaneous and unrestricted reproduction and dis-
SECTION 303 OF THE COPYRIGHTACTIS AMENDED
table cases have held that only a limited publication occurs when a composer
gives written copies of his musical work to musicians and orchestra leaders
for the purpose of facilitating a performance of the work,63 and when play-
wrights distribute copies of their play to business persons and production
professionals in order to obtain commercial production of their play.
64
Of course, the quintessential publication of a work occurs when copies
of the work are distributed to the public through commercial sale. If a copy
of the work can be purchased by anyone who desires a copy, the mere pay-
ment of the purchase price constitutes a general publication that is sufficient
to divest common law rights.65
Perhaps one of the most important precedents for the phonorecord
publication issue concerned the public performance of a work.66 In Ferris v.
Frohman,67 the United States Supreme Court held that the public perform-
ance of a play was not a publication and did not divest common law copy-
right.68 Although decided in 1912, the Ferris case was controlled by pre-
1909 Act federal copyright law. That law provided for federal protection of
plays, giving authors the exclusive right to make copies and to publicly per-
form their plays.69 The Ferris Court took note of this statute, but specifi-
cally found that it was not implicitly destructive of common law copyright in
plays that had not been published in the traditional sense of being printed on
paper and disseminated to the public.70 Despite being criticized for its char-
acterization of the English common law concerning performance rights,7 1 the
Ferris opinion has been lauded as embodying sound policy for its time:
That performance did not dedicate [to the public domain] even
though a means existed under the [federal] statute to secure per-
formance rights, also made an appeal to common sense so long as
the statute required the dramatist to publish as a condition of ob-
tribution constituted a general publication, thereby placing the speech into the public domain at the
time of its delivery.)
63. See, e.g., Allen v. Walt Disney Prods., 41 F. Supp. 134, 135-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
64. See Burnett v. Lambino, 204 F. Supp. 327, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
65. See id
66. It is important because the phonorecord has been likened to a public performance. See
Bailey, supra note 26, at 162-63 (citing Rosette v. Rainbo Records, 354 F. Supp. 1183, 1191-92
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) aftd, 546 F.2d 461 (2nd Cir. 1976)).
67. 223 U.S. 424 (1912).
68. Id. at 435.
69. See Rev. Stat. §§ 4952, 4956 (1875), amended by 26 Stat. 1106-07 (1891).
70. Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424, 435 (1912).
71. See Kaplan, supra note 15, at 474-75.
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tamining that protection.... Few authors of plays had any inde-
pendent economic incentive to publish, and it may have been
thought an undue burden to force this as a means of securing the
stage-right.72
Under section 12 of the 1909 Act, a common law copyright owner
could obtain federal statutory protection without publication, by merely de-
positing a copy with claim for copyright. 73 Although a cogent argument can
be made for having required creators who publicly performed their works to
comply with that section in order to retain exclusive control over their works
(i.e. overrule Ferris and find public performance divestitive, with exclusive
control only possible through the limited monopoly of the federal statute), 74
the post-Ferris case law did not move in that direction.
It therefore remained the rule that under the 1909 Act, a public per-
formance of a work did not constitute a publication that would divest an
owner of common law copyright.75 Common law copyright owners were
free to publicly perform their works, reaping whatever economic gain they
could, without fear that their common law copyrights would be lost.76
One other precedent that has been found to be important, indeed even
controlling to some courts on the issue of phonorecords and publication, is
the United States Supreme Court's holding regarding what constitutes a
"copy." In White-Smith Music Publ 'g Co. v. Apollo Co.,77 the Court held
that perforated rolls of paper used in automatic player pianos (pianola
72. Id. at 475-76. Professor Kaplan wrote that the principal objection to the Ferris rule "is
that it is abhorrent to the central theme of copyright to permit the dramatist (or composer) to ex-
ploit his work, and in the way most appropriate to the medium, without exacting the usual limits
on his monopoly." Id. at 479. Those "usual limits" are the durational limits of federal protection
as compared with the perpetual protection of the common law. Id. at 477-78.
73. 17 U.S.C. § 12 (1952) (repealed effecti- 1978).
74. See Kaplan, supra note 15, at 476-77.
75. See, e.g., Nutt v. National Institute, Inc., 31 F.2d 236, 238 (2nd Cir. 1929).
76. The Ferris rule has been applied in cases involving not only musical compositions.
McCarthy & Fisher v. White, 259 F. Supp. 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1919); see also King v. Mister Maestro,
Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (applying the Ferris rule to musical compositions); Burke
v. National Broadcasting Co., 598 F.2d 688 (lst Cir. 1979) (applying the Ferris rule to motion
pictures).
77. 209 U.S. I (1908).
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rolls) 78 were not copies of the musical compositions, the playing of which
was enabled by such rolls.79
White-Smith was a copyright infringement case where the plaintiff, as
assignee of the musical composer's federal copyright, argued that the pro-
duction of pianola rolls infringed its exclusive right to make copies of the
musical compositions.s8 The Court stated that while "[i]t may be true .. . in
a broad sense that a mechanical instrument which reproduces a tune copies
it... this is a strained and artificial meaning."" As a consequence, the
Court found it impossible to hold that a pianola roll, through which the mu-
sical composition was virtually indecipherable even by craftsmen skilled in
making such rolls,82 could be a copy of the musical composition. The Court
noted that copyright law did not protect "the intellectual conception apart
from the thing produced, however meritorious such conception may be."
8 3
Thus, the Court concluded that a musical composition could not be copied
until it had been "put in a form which others can see and read."'s4  Later,
courts followed the logic of the White-Smith Court and held that phonore-
cords were not copies of the underlying musical compositions.8 5
White-Smith was decided while the 1909 Copyright Act was being de-
bated in Congress. Interpreting the federal copyright statute as leaving mu-
sic copyright owners without a means of redress for another's technological
exploitation of their work, the White-Smith opinion at least recognized that
piano roll manufacturers were getting a "free ride."8 6 But, the Court said
78. The Court described such rolls as:
perforated sheets, which are passed over ducts connected with the operating parts of
the mechanism in such a manner that the same are kept sealed until, by means of the
perforations in the rolls, air pressure is admitted to the ducts which operate the
pneumatic devices to sound the notes. This is done with the aid of an operator, upon
whose skill and experience the success of the rendition largely depends. As the roll
is drawn over the tracker board the notes are sounded as the perforations admit the
atmospheric pressure, the perforations having been so arranged that the effect is to
produce the melody or tune for which the roll has been cut.
Id. at 10.
79. Id. at 17-18.
80. Id. at 8-9.
81. Id. at 17.
82. Id at 18. The Court did, however, acknowledge that "there is some testimony to the ef-
fect that great skill and patience might enable the operator to read this record as he could a piece of
music written in staff notation." Id.
83. White-Smnth, 209 U.S. at 17.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Corcoran v. Montgomery Ward, 121 F.2d 572, 573 (9th Cir. 1941).
86. White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 18.
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that "such considerations properly address themselves to the legislative, and
not to the judicial, branch of the government." As a result, the music com-
posers and publishers lobbied Congress for inclusion in the new law of ex-
clusive rights for the manufacture and sale of mechanical devices (e.g. pi-
anola rolls or phonograph records) that embody musical compositions.
Congress could have done so by simply stating in the 1909 Act that me-
chanical embodiments of music were copies of the underlying musical com-
positions. It did not do so, however, largely because of the fear of creating a
monopoly.17 The Aeolian Company, a manufacturer of pianola pianos, had
evidently anticipated a favorable decision for copyright owners in the White-
Smith case and, therefore, bought the rights to vast numbers of songs from
American music publishers."8 Congress feared the absolute control which
Aeolian would have had over mechanical reproduction of such a vast
amount of music if Congress decided to allow musical copyright owners the
same exclusive rights over mechanical reproductions as the law allowed
such owners over written sheet music.
In order to combat this problem, Congress extended copyright protec-
tion to mechanical reproductions of music and provided for compulsory li-
censes under section 1(e) of the 1909 Act.8 9 The compulsory license provi-
sion essentially provided that once a musical copyright owner allowed his
work to be captured in something like a phonorecord or pianola roll, any
other person could do likewise by simply paying the copyright owner a
statutory fee of two cents per copy. Obviously, this prevented Aeolian from
exercising exclusive control over mechanical reproduction of the songs it
owned because once it exploited its right by making pianola rolls, anyone
else could do so upon paying the statutory license fee.' °
The comprehensive effect of this statutory law and precedent has
proven to be powerful ammunition in the persistent arguments on both sides
of the phonorecord publication issue. Courts have decided both ways on the
issue, sometimes focusing on the statutory language and precedent, and
other times focusing on the perceived policies of American copyright law.
The following section will summarize this disparate body of case law which
reflected the state of the law prior to the amendment to section 303 of the
1976 Copyright Act.
87. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY 67 (1994).
88. Id. at 65.
89. 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1952) (repealed effective 1978).
90. A compulsory license available to sound recording companies today continues under the
present copyright act. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1976).
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III. CASE LAW ON PUBLICATION AND PHONORECORD DISTRIBUTION
A. Some Noteworthy Distinctions
At the outset, copyright in a musical composition embodied in a copy,
and the copyright in a particular performance (the actual sounds) of the
composition embodied in the phonorecord, must be considered. 91 At com-
mon law and under the federal Copyright Act of 1909, as amended in 1972,
copyright in a musical work was distinct from a copyright in a sound re-
cording.92 The 1972 amendment to the 1909 Copyright Act did not expand
the rights of those who held copyrights in the underlying musical composi-
tions. The copyright owner of a musical work, once having exercised its
common law right of first publication within the United States could not
prevent a subsequent distribution of a recorded rendition of that song.
Rather, the owner of the musical work copyright, if he/she had obtained fed-
eral copyright protection through publication with notice and deposit with
the copyright office, was left with the remedies provided for under the com-
pulsory license provisions of section l(e) of the 1909 Act.93 The owner of
the copyright in a sound recording, however, could prevent an unauthorized
distribution of the particular performance of the music or actual sounds re-
corded. 94
B. Phonorecord Distribution of the Recorded Performance
Before there was federal copyright protection for sound recordings,
there had been some disagreement in the courts as to whether phonorecord
distribution constituted divestitive publication of the common law copyright
in the recorded performance. For example, in RCA Manufacturing Co. v..
91. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
92. Such recorded performances became covered under the federal law on February 15,
1972, the effective date of the 1971 Sound Recording Amendment to the Copyright Act of 1909.
That amendment modified the 1909 Act not only to make explicit the eligibility of recorded per-
formances or sound recordings for a copyright but also to prevent the unauthorized duplication of
the exact sounds found on a particular phonorecord.
Reproductions of sound recordings were denominated "copies" thereof under section § 26 of
the 1909 Act, thus making unauthorized reproduction subject to the normal infringement remedies.
93. 17 U.S.C. § (1Xe) (1952) (repealed effective 1978).
94. 17 U.S.C. § 26 (Supp. 1977) (repealed 1978).
19981
40 LOYOLA OFLOSANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19
Whiteman,95 Judge Learned Hand found that phonorecord distribution did
divest the common law copyright in the recorded performance. 96 The conse-
quence of Judge Hand's holding, given the absence of a federal copyright in
sound recordings before 1972, was that a recorded performance distributed
on phonorecords would thereafter be in the public domain. Subsequent deci-
sions of other courts generally disagreed with Judge Hand's decision in
Whiteman finding instead that common law rights in the recorded perform-
ance survived phonorecord distribution.97
Eventually, in Goldstein v. California,98 the United States Supreme
Court held that states could protect performances recorded before February
15, 1972 from piracy without regard to the fact that such performances had
been widely distributed on phonorecords. 99 The Court, however, did not de-
cide the issue of whether a general publication of the musical work that un-
derlay the recorded performance occurred when phonorecords of the per-
formance were distributed. It did, however, dismiss the argument that,
under federal law, the recorded performances had been publishedl °° stating:
We have no need to determine whether, under state law, these re-
cordings had been published or what legal consequences such
publication might have. For purposes of federal law,
'publication' serves only as a term of the art which defines the le-
gal relationships which Congress has adopted under the federal
copyright statutes. As to categories of writings which Congress
has not brought within the scope of the federal statute, the term
has no application. 10 1
95. 114 F.2d 86 (2nd Cir. 1940).
96. Id. at 88.
97. See, e.g., Capitol Records v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 663 (2nd Cir. 1955);
National Ass'n of Performing Artists v. William Penn Broadcasting Co., 38 F. Supp. 531, 533
(E.D. Pa. 1941). As a consequence of these holdings, states remained free to provide legal protec-
tion to sound recordings at common law or by statute.
98. 412 U.S. 546 (1972).
99. The Goldstein case mainly concerned issues of federalism and preemption of state law.
In Goldstein, defendants in a state criminal action for record piracy argued that by virtue of the
Constitutional Copyright Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, and the federal Copyright Act en-
acted thereunder, the states were preempted from regulating the area, regardless of the fact that
Congress had not seen fit to bring the particular type of work at issue in the case, sound record-
ings, within the ambit of federal protection. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 551. The Court ultimately al-
lowed the state to prosecute for record piracy, saying that we cannot discern such an unyielding
national interest as to require an inference that state power to grant copyrights has been relin-
quished to exclusive federal control. Id. at 558.
100. ld. at 551.
101. Id. at 570 n.28.
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By negative inference, it would seem that the Court believed that
"publication" was a federal question with regard to works that the federal
statute did protect, such as musical compositions.
10 2
C. Phonorecord Distribution and Musical Compositions
From the late 1940's on, courts routinely made pronouncements in
dicta and in their holdings, regarding whether phonorecord distribution was
a publication sufficient to divest common law copyright in the underlying
musical composition. Some of the earlier cases relied on Judge Hand's
Whiteman opinion for support, even though that case actually dealt with
common law rights in the recorded performance, and not the musical compo-
sition itself.
While there has been some disagreement among commentators and
courts as to which position represented the majority view, 103 it is clear that a
realistic appraisal of case law reveals that there was no clear majority.
Cases holding or suggesting that phonorecord distribution was a divestitive
publication of the underlying musical composition go back as far as 1949,1°4
and even so far as 1940, if Judge Hand's opinion in Whiteman is included.10 5
Additionally, cases holding that common law copyright survived phonore-
cord distribution arguably go back as far as 1947.106
The reigning authority for each position are the court of appeals deci-
sions from the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit. The cases within these
circuits present the most clearly articulated arguments regarding their re-
spective positions and, thus, will occupy the majority of the following dis-
cussion.
102. This also was apparently the position of Judge Learned Hand. See, e.g., RCA Mfg. Co.
v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 87-90 (2d Cir. 1940); Capitol Records v. Mercury Records Corp., 221
F.2d 657, 666-67 (2d Cir. 1955) (Hand, J., dissenting).
103. Compare NUlvffM, supra note 27, at § 4.05[B][2] with Bailey, supra note 26, at 164.
104. See, e.g., Mayhew v. Gusto Records, 960 F. Supp. 1302 (M.D. Tenn. 1997); Int'l Tape
Mfrs. Ass'n v. Gerstein, 344 F. Supp. 38 (S.D. Fla. 1972); McIntyre v. Double-A Music, 166 F.
Supp. 681 (S.D. Cal. 1958); Mills Music v. Cromwell Music, 126 F. Supp. 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1954);
Shapiro, Bernstein, & Co. v. Miracle Record Co., 91 F. Supp. 473 (N.D. III. 1950); Blanc v. Lantz,
83 U.S.P.Q. 137 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1949).
105. 114 F.2d 86 (2nd Cir. 1940).
106. See, e.g., Capitol Records v. Mercury Records, 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955); Tempo
Music v. Famous Music, 838 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Jones v. Virgin Records, 643 F.
Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Dealer Advertising v. Barbara Allen Fin. Advertising, 209 U.S.P.Q.
1003 (W.D. Mich. 1979); Nom Music v. Kaslin, 227 F. Supp. 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Yacoubian v.
Carroll, 74 U.S.P.Q. 257 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
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D. Rosette: The Second Circuit's Analysis
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Rosette
v. Rainbo Record Mfg.,' °7 held per curium, that the widespread distribution
of phonorecords was not a publication of the underlying musical composi-
tion. The court affirmed a district court's holding and relied on the reason-
ing of the lower court's opinion,0 8 written by District Judge Gurfein.
Rosette involved claims for violation of statutory and common law
copyright in thirty-three children's songs. 09 As a defense, defendant Rainbo
Manufacturing alleged that twenty of the compositions were within the pub-
lic domain by virtue of the plaintiff's prior publication without notice."'
The plaintiff admitted that several of her musical compositions had been re-
corded and released on phonorecords. "'
After a brief summary of common law copyright publication doctrine,
Judge Gurfein articulated some competing policies:
On the one hand there is distaste for the perpetual monopoly that
sustaining common law rights unlimited in time involves. On the
other, there is a strong reaction that precedent should be reliable
rather than a trap for the unwary, particularly in a technical field
where the lawyers, assumed to be learned, guide the hand of the
untutored artist .... the practicing copyright bar has voiced its
objection to relinquishing what they consider stare decisis so as
to cast into the public domain thousands of works of popular and
classical music, performances of which have been distributed on
phonograph records without statutory copyright in reliance upon
the rule of law that a distribution of phonograph records is not a
publication. "
2
In doing so, Judge Gurfein revealed his sympathy for the copyright
owner's position and determined that there was substantial precedent for the
proposition that phonorecord distribution was not a publication.
After taking note of the White-Smith decision and the 1909 Act's an-
swer thereto of extending federal copyright protection to mechanical repro-
ductions by way of the compulsory license provision, the judge went on to
summarize some of the case law cited by the defendant in support of its as-
107. 546 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1976).
108. Rosette v. Rainbo Record Mfg., 354 F. Supp. 1183 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
109. ld. at 1184.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1185.
112. Id. at 1189.
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sertion that phonorecord distribution was a divestitive publication.'13 Sig-
nificantly, Judge Gurfein found those cases lacking in their failure to take
into account the White-Smith decision "or the impact of the 1909 Act on its
doctrine.',1 14 It was the judge's opinion that, under the 1909 Act, a phonore-
cord should be treated as a performance, and therefore was not divestitive of
copyright protection. Thus, in concluding that the 1909 Act had not over-
ruled White-Smith, Judge Gurfein stated that "[tlhe argument that the per-
manency of the recording makes it more than a mere performance is an ar-
gument that the Congress did not accept or it could easily have made such
an enactment.""' 5 The Judge added that with White-Smith still intact:
[I]t was logical to conclude that if the infringing music roll was
not a copy of the composition so as to cast its maker in liability,
the creation of a music roll by the author himself would not make
it a "copy" of his work and hence not a publication of it.116
But, Judge Gurfein was not content to hold that common law copyright
had survived phonorecord distribution, due to the fact that he was aware that
in so doing, the owner of a common law copyright in a musical composition
would arguably retain the common law right in perpetuity, so long as she did
not publish the songs in the traditional sense of disseminating sheet music.
This perpetual protection stood in stark contrast to the limited monopoly of
the federal statutory right that was limited to a maximum of fifty-six years.
Moreover, the statutory right was even more limited in that it consisted only
of a compulsory license fee that the statutory copyright owner was entitled
to only after giving a notice of use. 17. This presented an important question
of federalism and preemption:
Can the States, by virtue of the common law, constitutionally im-
pose a lesser requirement when copyright has been vested by the
113. Id. at 1190-91.
114. Rosette, 354 F. Supp. at 1191.
115. Id. at 1191-92.
116. Id. at 1189.
117. Id. at 1192 (citing 17 U.S.C. § l(e) (1952) (repealed effective 1978)). Section 1(e) of
the 1909 Act provided, in pertinent part:
It shall be the duty of the copyright owner, if he uses the musical composition him-
self for the manufacture of parts of instruments serving to reproduce mechanically
the musical work, or licenses others to do so, to file notice thereof ... in the copy-
right office, and any failure to file such notice shall be a complete defense to any suit
... for any infringement of such copyright.
17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1952) (repealed effective 1978).
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Constitution in the national Government? Must the impediments
to the free exercise of the statutory copyright be held to limit the
exploitation of the common law copyright to the same degree?"'
The point was especially troubling because section 2 of the 1909 Act
explicitly legitimated common law copyright by asserting:
[n]othing in this title shall be construed to annul or limit the right
of the author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common
law or in equity, to prevent the copying, publication, or use of
such unpublished work without his consent, and to obtain dam-
ages therefore.' 19
Therefore, Judge Gurfein was faced with a statute that at once sought
to preserve all common law rights and sought to offer the limited monopoly
of federal copyright protection for musical compositions.
Musical compositions, covered within the 1909 Act, were clearly the
type of work upon which Congress wanted to impose a societal bargain with
creators-the bargain consisting of allowing the creator to profit from a
limited federal protection for an exploited work in exchange for an eventual
dedication to the public after the statutory term of copyright had ended.
However, it could be argued that Judge Gurfein's holding that phonorecord
distribution was not a divestitive publication extends common law copyright
protection indefinitely, allowing the composer of the music to completely
exploit his creation, in the medium most suited to it, without having to pay
his end of the bargain by dedicating to the public.
Judge Gurfein solved this problem by limiting the available remedies
for common law copyright holders despite the savings clause of section 2.
He concluded that:
[t]o avoid the constitutional problem I think that the exception of
Section 2 of the Copyright Law [preserving common law copy-
right] must be limited to exclude the sale of phonograph records
from the protection given to the owner of an unpublished manu-
script to the extent that the common law right exceeds the rights
of statutory copyright owners. The conditions for use of the mu-
sical composition on phonograph records are so well defined in
the comprehensive Copyright Act of 1909 that it is unlikely that
the Congress intended that contradictory principles of State law
should survive. 20
118. Id.
119. 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1952) (repealed effective 1978).
120. Rosette, 354 F. Supp. at 1193.
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Under the rule announced in Rosette:
[t]he sale of phonograph records is not a divestment of common
law rights by publication but ... it does inhibit suit against in-
fringers until the statutory copyright is obtained and the notice of
use is filed. Thereafter, ...the statutory copyright owner may
sue for subsequent infringement.1
21
To this end, upon distribution, the common law copyright is an incho-
ate right that is unenforceable. Its existence in such state, however, does
guarantee the copyright owner the opportunity to secure the statutory copy-
right. In doing so, the copyright owner's federal right is complete and en-
forceable against an infringer.
E. La Cienega: A View From the Ninth Circuit
In 1995, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit con-
sidered Rosette. The court within this circuit characterized the opinion in
Rosette as the minority rule, and refused to follow it. In La Cienega Music
v. ZZ Top,122 a divided panel held that, under the 1909 Copyright Act, a
distribution of phonorecords without any copyright notice constituted a di-
vestitive publication of the underlying musical composition and irrevocably
injected the work into the public domain.
La Cienega concerned a song, written in 1948 and revised in 1950 and
1970, by John Lee Hooker and Bernard Besman entitled "Boogie Chil-
len.' ', 23 The first version of the song was released to the public on phonore-
cords nineteen years before it was registered with the Copyright Office.
Thus, if such phonorecord distribution were deemed publication, the work
would fall into the public domain and could not be subsequently protected
under the federal law. When Besmen, through his music company La
Cienega, sued the band ZZ Top for infringing the copyright in "Boogie
Chillen" in their song "La Grange," ZZ Top asserted the defense of prior
publication and public domain.' 24
121. Id.
122. 53 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 1995).
123. Id. at 952.
124. Id. at 952.
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After quoting extensively from the Nimmer treatise'25 on copyright law
to support its determination that Rosette was the minority rule, 12 6 the court
offered an additional argument for its position that phonorecord distribution
was divestitive publication. The court stated that:
Rosette reduces the incentive to immediate compliance with the
1909 Act. According to the statutory scheme, an artist who
composes a song, wants to sell recordings immediately, and thus
copyrights the song in compliance with the 1909 Act, has 28
years of copyright protection from the time of compliance. In
contrast, under Rosette, an artist who does not so comply can sell
any number of recordings for several years, receiving common
law copyright protection all the while, before copyrighting the
work with the Copyright Office. From the point of this late com-
pliance on, the statutory copyright owner receives 28 years of
federal protection. Rosette consequently may encourage artists to
delay compliance with the Copyright Act's requirements and
thereby receive "longer" copyright protection. Such an outcome
would clearly be undesirable.
2 7
As the passage indicates, the Ninth Circuit was concerned with Ro-
sette's effect on the policy of limiting the duration of protection for a work
once its creator had commenced commercial exploitation of it. The court
clearly believed that this had been done as a result of any sale of phonore-
cords embodying the song.
Ultimately, the court remanded the case for a determination as to
whether La Cienega had complied with the notice requirement of the 1909
Act 128 necessary to secure federal copyright upon publication. 29 If not, it
would have no claim to copyright, as the song would have fallen into the
public domain. 3°
125. See NIMMER, supra note 27.
126. La Cienega, 53 F.3d at 953.
127. Id.(referring to Rosette, 354 F. Supp. at 1193).
128. 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1952) (repealed effective 1978).
129. La Cienega, 53 F.3d at 954.
130. Judge Fernandez dissented from the majority opinion with regard to the issue of publi-
cation. Id. He agreed with Rosette, noting that while it "may present some difficulty, it does
grapple with the conundrum posed by White-Smith." Id.
For Judge Fernandez, there simply was no way to reconcile the rule that a phonorecord is not
a copy with a holding that phonorecord distribution is a divestitive publication. Id. at 954-55.
Apparently for Judge Fernandez and Judge Gurfein (the Rosette district court judge) only distribu-
tion of copies could be deemed a publication, and there could be only one consistent definition of
"copy," the one articulated in White-Smith.
Like Judge Gurfein, the dissenting Judge Fernandez realized that he,
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IV. PROBLEMS: ROSETTE AND LA CIENEGA
Under Rosette, the owner of the common law copyright in a musical
composition could not recover for any actual infringement until the in-
fringement of which he had knowledge was sufficient to motivate him to
register his work under the federal Copyright Act. Because registration
could take place quickly, the author could register (and give notice) in plenty
of time to prevent extensive infringement. On the other hand, authors may
indeed prefer to miss out on a remedy for a small amount of infringement by
not registering in exchange for an extension of the time for exclusive rights.
If an author were lucky enough to avoid large-scale infringement for a time
sufficient to reap substantial economic gain, he would have in fact gained
something. Namely, that exact amount of extra time in which to exploit the
exclusive rights, all in exchange for missing out on possibly small remedial
amounts under the statute-small because the work could be registered
quickly enough to prevent substantial infringement.
As for the majority in La Cienega, its justification is not sound today,
nor was it at the time the Ninth Circuit decided the case. It cannot be said
that adherence to Rosette, i.e. holding phonorecord distribution is not a di-
vestitive publication, "reduces the incentive toward immediate compliance
with the 1909 Act.""'' The 1909 Act is not now, nor was it at the time of
decision in La Cienega, the governing law. A decision about the conse-
quences of phonorecord distribution under that law can no longer provide
any incentives at all. It can only affect whether a particular musical compo-
sition, distributed on phonorecords before January 1, 1978, will be protected
under the 1976 Copyright Act by virtue of having been "unpublished" and
fixed in a tangible medium of expression on January 1, 1978, or will be de-
nied protection because it was "published" and therefore was in public do-
main on January 1, 1978. A decision made today about the
[M]ust confront the argument that it might appear that a common law copyright
holder has greater rights than a person who has actually registered his copyright un-
der the 1909 Act. Rosette avoided that difficulty by deciding that the actual protec-
tive part of copyright-the right to recover for another's use of recordings of the mu-
sical work-would have to await the registration of the work, as contemplated by 17
U.S.C. § I(e) (1909). Thus, the author of the copyrighted work really could not ob-
tain any greater protection than that available to the author of a registered work.
Id at 955. The conclusion of Judge Fernandez is questionable. An author might be able to enjoy
common law protection for a considerable time before an infringement motivated him to register
and give notice of use under the 1909 Act as required by Rosette.
131. Id. at 953.
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legal consequences of past actions, under a prospectively inapplicable law,
cannot rationally be justified as increasing or reducing incentives. 32
V. SECTION 303(B): THE AMENDMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEMS
In reaction to the La Cienega decision, bills to reverse it were intro-
duced before Congress.133 This decision, it was thought, placed "all pre-
1978 works.., under a cloud since,. . . most recordings of musical works
at that time were released without a copyright notice for works contained
within. , ,A34
With the legislation pending, a field hearing was held in June of 1997
in Nashville. 35  Following this hearing, it was determined that it was im-
practicable for music composers and their publishers to "ensure that a phon-
orecord cover contain a copyright notice.'
' 36
It was also found that the Copyright Office's interpretation of the 1909
Act's "notice" provisions led it to the same conclusion that "the release of a
phonorecord was not a 'copy' for purposes of the Act."' 3 7 Finally, it was
reported that, based upon this interpretation, the Copyright Office had been
advising the copyright owners of music both before and after the Rosette
opinion that "there was no need to comply with the 1909 notification re-
quirements for phonorecord releases.' 38
Both the long-standing policy and advice of the Copyright Office and
the widespread music industry practice were at odds with the La Cienega
decision. With this history before it, Congress amended section 303 taking
direct aim at La Cienega. Subsection (b) was added to section 303 provid-
ing as follows: "The distribution before January 1, 1978, of a phonorecord
shall not for any purpose constitute a publication of the musical work em-
132. In 1998, for example, the author of a song written in 1970 which under La Cienega was
dedicated to the public would be induced or dissuaded to write another song based on the present
Copyright Act's incentives and not those of its predecessor, the 1909 Act.
133. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 105-325 (1997).
134. Id. No notice of the copyright claimed in the musical work was placed on the recorded
version because copyright owners were relying on the advice of the Copyright Office and the Ro-
sette decision as well as White-Smith. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. In this regard, it is the sound recording company which issues the cover record and
can do so without the express authority of the copyright owner of the music. 17 U.S.C. § 115
(1976) (setting forth the compulsory licensing provision of the present Copyright Act). The 1909
Act's compulsory licensing provision was of similar effect. See supra note 87 and accompanying
text.
137. H.R. REP. No. 105-325 (1997).
138. Id.
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bodied therein .... ." The Copyright Act has thus eliminated the potential
effect La Cienega. "9
VI. CONCLUSION
If industry and agency practice are sufficient to justify delivering a
knockout blow to the La Cienega decision, then section 303 (b) is the only
legislative course of action. It does unequivocally confirm that business
should proceed as usual. And, it is a $1.2 billion business by recent ac-
counts. 140
If policy choices are going to dictate the outcome in phonorecord pub-
lication cases, these decisions definitely cannot be commensurate with those
policies expressed in La Cienega. For under those policies, the public
would continue to pay for the phonorecord cover of the musical work but the
author would not receive the benefits of record royalties.
Congressional decision-making as expressed by section 303 (b) con-
cerning the subsistence of a copyright in those musical works created before
January 1, 1978 and distributed in the form of a phonorecord before that
date should be based on the broader policy concerns running through copy-
right law. Section 303 (b) reflects the belief that the main policy of copy-
right is to maximize the number of works available and minimize the prices
of those works. The opportunity to find that many thousands of musical
compositions were freely available because they were in the public domain
was not appealing precisely because such a holding would have deflated the
confidence potential future creators would have had in their society's will-
ingness to protect them. Section 303 (b) will also motivate the songwriter
because she begins to trust in society's willingness to protect her once her
creation exists. Whether this conclusion is doubtful only time and the appli-
cation of section 303 (b) will tell.
41
139. The effect of the amendment upon the rights of the actual litigants in La Cienega is be-
yond the scope of this article.
140. H.R. REP. No. 105-325, at 11 (1997) (discussing annual revenues generated by phon-
orecord distribution of musical works at issue).
141. The arguments on both sides of this issue have merit. Thus, it is possible that a poten-
tial future song writer will believe that society has kept its bargain by enacting of section 303 (b) of
the Copyright Act. However, it may as equally be said of this person, that she would probably not
reduce her creative output absent this new amendment.
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